Why no Cohabitation in Taiwan?
An analysis of Taiwan's Constitution and its application Thus the Taiwan political system, constitutionally speaking, resembles more the French semi-presidential system in the Fifth Republic, than the US-style presidential system. However, despite this strong resemblance, the systems are distinct. While France has experienced three cohabitations-in 1986, 1993 and 1997-, how is that Taiwan has not taken the same route? Does the ROC Constitution require cohabitation when the President has lost majority support in Parliament? What has prevented cohabitation since President Chen Shui-bian's election in 2000 3 ?
Constitutional framework 2
In general, there is consensus among scholars that Taiwan's political system resembles the dual-executive or what Maurice Duverger termed the semi-presidential system of the Fifth Republic in France 4 . Duverger defines three conditions for a constitutional system to be termed "semi-presidential" 5 : the President is directly elected for a fixed term; the President possesses quite considerable powers; and, the Constitution grants both the head of state-the President-and the head of the government-the Prime Minister-to share executive power 6 . France, after its 1962 Constitutional reform, which created a directly elected President by a popular vote, and Taiwan, with its Constitution amended in 1997, which authorises the direct nomination of the Premier by the President without the consent of the Parliament, meet the first two of Duverger's three conditions 7 .
does not have majority support in Parliament; whereas Taiwan's constitutional framework does not, whether the President has the support of the Parliament or not. Article 49 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has no parallel in the ROC Constitution. According to this Article 49, the Prime Minister can request the National Assembly to cast a confidence vote, which legally prevents the emergence of a divided government in France thus favouring cohabitation 10 . Such a confidence vote, if supported by Parliament, can further legitimise the role of the Prime Minister as a counterbalance to the power of the President. In other words, in France, the situation of the President and the Prime Minister holding equal power is strengthened by Article 49. Such a footing can provide an incentive yet also a constraint for the President to choose cohabitation, rather than a divided government in which the Prime Minister might fail to gain the confidence vote of Parliament immediately after appointment. In Taiwan's system, the absence of this resort to a confidence vote not being prescribed in the Constitution, means there is no strong incentive to choose cohabitation 11 .
7
Furthermore, France and Taiwan have in place slightly different mechanisms where the crucial no-confidence vote, which can break executive-legislative gridlock and initiate a sprit of responsible politics in the parliamentary system, is concerned 12 . In Taiwan, if the legislature finds the Premier unacceptable, its only constitutional option is to undertake a vote of no-confidence in accordance with amendment article 3, which, if it passes, opens the door for the President to passively dissolve the legislature 13 . Therefore, under threat of being dissolved by the President, the legislature must think twice before issuing a vote of no-confidence which will lessen the leverage power of legislature on the Premier. As the President has the power to appoint or remove the Premier, cohabitation could be a possible option, but is not required by the Constitution.
President and Premier after the 1997 Constitution revision 8
The rule is quite different in France, especially concerning the President's active right to dissolve the Parliament. Article 49 Section 2 of Fifth Republic Constitution rules that the National Assembly can propose a vote of no-confidence with more than a one-tenth vote of the total Parliament members. Due to the frequent issuing of no-confidence votes in the Third and Fourth Republics, Article 12 of the Fifth Republic Constitution grants the President the right to actively dissolve Parliament 14 . This rule may to a certain extent institutionalise the emergence of cohabitation through the presidential power if the President dissolves the Parliament and the re-election result of the new Parliament still forces the President to face an opposition majority 15 .
Constitutional practice 9
The purpose of analysing how the Constitution works in practice, of the gap between the written Constitution and its application, and of the dynamic interaction with psychological, social and cultural traits, is to explore why under a similar constitutional framework-a semi-presidential system-France has seen cohabitations and Taiwan up to now has not.
11 The no-confidence vote mechanism design is originated from the parliamentary system and its purpose is maintaining a responsible politic, balance of power between government branches and resolving executive-legislative gridlock. However, the noconfidence vote mechanism has never been used in Taiwan, for legislators are unwilling to trigger its introduction unless urgently needed. Without a no-confidence vote, the President can continue with an opposition majority in Parliament: this has happened several times and appears to be becoming a constitutional routine.
12 What prevents legislators casting a vote of no-confidence is rooted in the electoral system of the multi-member district with a single-non-transferable vote (SNTV) in which legislators run for re-election at great risk 16 . In the SNTV, a voter has only one vote in a multi-member district and the vote is not transferable. Moreover, while each individual candidate need only obtain enough ballots to pass the threshold of exclusion to be elected, intra-party competition might be stiffer than inter-party competition during elections 17 . Every candidate must stand out, and closely watch his/her brokers and loyal supporters in order to avoid vote erosion 18 . So, if having been through a highly competitive election and having finally been elected as legislators, being rational actors, they would not easily cast a vote of no-confidence, which would be equivalent to giving up their legislative seat and gambling again on the next legislative re-election 19 .
13 Moreover, according to a recent survey, the average spend of a legislative candidate during a single election amounts to NT$42 million 20 which makes a no-confidence vote and the consequential re-election campaign for legislators very expensive and clearly less preferable. Therefore, without exercising a no-confidence vote, a divided government called by a Taiwan President can survive without considering cohabitation as an option 21 .
Lack of historical path dependence
14 Another factor that may prevent the emergence of cohabitation in Taiwan can be understood by the lack of any historical experience of any similar system in the past in Taiwan.
15 Taiwan, heavy with historical political experience, and Taiwan people, have a great expectation of the role of a President. Even the operation of the dual-executivenamely two rulers, the President and the Premier-, and prescribed in the semipresidential system of Taiwan, can hardly be accepted, even as a concept 22 . Taiwan has had 37 years of a highly centralised interim rule under a strong man and KMT rules, a period during which the Constitution, which permitted a balance of power, was suspended 23 . One ruling organ-the President or the KMT-was for a long time the only source of authority and power for the government. Even after 1996 when President Lee Teng-hui was directly elected, his ruling style is characterised as "super-presidential". Former Premier Chang Chun-hsiung pointed out that "A President who can nominate the Premier without consent of Parliament, is not required to be responsible for Parliament, yet has the right to dissolve Parliament, is creating a powerful President without responsibility and a powerless Premier with responsibility 24 . What Taiwan people expect from a popular elected President exceeds the constitutional right a President can hold. The idea of a second ruler-the Premier to counterbalance the President or to co-rule with the President, has so far hardly found historical support in the Taiwan community. 2001 . President Chen Shuibian often used the US President as an example to exert influence in the appointment of personnel in the Executive Yuan, which showed his intention to pull the system towards a US-style presidential system. However, countries such as Australia, Ireland, Singapore and Portugal all directly elect their President, yet none of their systems can be defined as presidential, and Taiwan does not have a presidential system formally established by its constitution either. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (1992) , Robert Eligie in Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (1999) , have also discussed different practices of semi-presidentialism around the world. Robert Eligie has attempted to define the concept of semi-presidentialism via three approaches. Firstly, semi-presidentialism is said to be a type of democratic regime where executive power is divided between a President and a Prime Minister but where the President has substantial powers. It also concerns specific constitutional arrangements with actual powers as Maurice Duverger has specified. Further, semipresidentialism can be simply a type of regime with dispositional properties in which a popularly-elected, fixed-term President exists alongside a Prime Minister and cabinet who are responsible to Parliament, regardless of how powerful a president is ("Semipresidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations", October 24th-25th 2003, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, pp. 4-7).
7.
Taiwan is most likely to be included in the third type of semi-presidentialism under this category elaborated by Eligie. 
11.
Although both the French and Taiwan Constitutions state that the Premier is responsible before Parliament, in France this often means that the Prime Minister, although appointed by the President, must represent the parliamentary majority. In Taiwan, the Premier might not be expected to represent the parliamentary majority; his or her role might resemble more the role of the "chief of staff" in the US presidential system.
12.
This point shows the main gap between the Constitution and constitutional practice.
13. Amendment article 3: With the signatures of more than one-third of the total number of Legislative Yuan members, the Legislative Yuan may propose a noconfidence vote against the Premier. The Premier shall tender his resignation within ten days and at the same time may request that the President dissolve the Legislative Yuan.
14. Fifth Republic Constitution, Article 12: The President, upon consultation with the Prime Minister and chairmen of the two chambers, can dissolve the Parliament.
15. In the complex relationship between the President, the Executive and the Legislature throughout the French history, there is a constitutional custom worth mentioning. On June 25th 1877, President Mac-Mahon dissolved Parliament with the intention of changing the majority composition of the Parliament and nominating a Prime Minister of his own preference. However, the dissolution of the Parliament leaded ultimately to the same composition of parties and subsequently to Mac-Mahon's resignation. The Mac-Mahon case created a constitutional routine for France: "if not accepting the majority in Parliament, a President shall then resign". Such constitutional routine cannot be found in Taiwan, reducing the likelihood of cohabitation.
16.
The current term for a legislator is three years, which may also influence cost considerations. Yet, this might not be the main reason which results in unfunctionality of the no-confidence vote. Worth mentioning is that in a near future with the new electoral rule for the next term legislative election, namely a four-year term and the single member district method, the cost of re-election might face more uncertainty.
17. Gary W. Cox and Frances Rosenbluth, "The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan", American Political Science Review, No. 87, 1993, p. 579. 18. Wang Yeh-lih, "The Political Consequences of the Electoral System: Single Non Transferable Voting in Taiwan", Issues & Studies, August 1996. p. 96 . Wang also points out that under SNTV, party identification is less important unless there is only one candidate in the district. More emphasis has been made on individual candidates when a party has many candidates competing in the same district.
19.
See Yang James Jih-Ching, "Effects of Constitutional Amendment and Party Reorganization on Constitutional Framework", Theory and Policy, July 2000, Vol. 54, pp. 199-218 (in Chinese) .
20.
Melody Chen, "Social alliance pushes for two vote election system", Taipei Times, August 19th 2003. In this report, Chien Hsi-chieh, a DPP lawmaker and executive director of the Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan, cited a recent survey that revealed the average cost a legislative candidate has to spend during a single election amounts to NT$42 million". A legislator's pay during his or her term totals, at most, NT$20 million, Chien said.
21.
Despite the fact that the no-confidence vote in Taiwan has never been used, President Chen, after experiencing much legislative gridlock, has begun to consult the opinions of the opposition party in the Legislative Yuan. The recent 10 points consensus reached by Chen Shui-bian and Soong Chu-yu exemplifies such an attempt.
